About Critical Minerals, What’s New?
Political Economy of Resource-based Development Revisited
Tao Louie Xu
I recently drafted a literature review as a working paper on transforming critical-mineral resources into productive capabilities. It left me with much to reflect upon. What makes me sigh most is how so many old problems I encountered in the literature. More than seventy years of theoretical development, yet so bloody many lessons still seem to have gone unheeded in practice. When I say bloody, it means this history with real people’s blood.
Let us begin.
1. Introduction
Lithium, cobalt, nickel, and rare earths are becoming strategic resources in the global energy transition, technological competition, and geoeconomic restructuring. The United States and the European Union, among the world’s most powerful economies (some may argue that they are declining, but that hardly changes how powerful they remain), are increasingly concerned about critical mineral supply security, scrambling to diversify supply chains and pursue more active industrial policy actions.
Despite that, many resource-producing countries still confront a very age-old development question. Just how old? The world after the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, the international economic order following the Second World War in 1945, globalisation after the Cold War ended in 1991, and the subsequent decades of neoliberalism all confronted versions of the same question. How can countries use their natural resources to build industrial capabilities and ensure that their societies share in the benefits of development?
Looking further back, the colonial international division of labour had already reduced many territories to suppliers of raw materials. These contradictions have been here for centuries. Even within modern development economics, more than seventy years have passed since Prebisch (1949/1950) systematically examined developmental inequalities between the centre and the periphery.
For anyone studying the political economy of development, these questions should be so familiar. Almost infuriatingly familiar! Today, the US and EU worry about critical mineral supply security, whilst resource-producing countries continue struggling for domestic processing, technological learning, and industrial upgrading. Does the growing importance of a mineral to the global economy necessarily mean greater development opportunities for the countries possessing it?
The strategic importance of critical minerals is being redefined. Yet, whether mineral resources can be transformed into industrial capabilities and broadly shared development benefits remains constrained by longstanding structural determinants, i.e. the international division of production, power struggles between states and firms, and technological learning. New technologies and international economic orders, as they have throughout history, continually change how these contradictions manifest themselves, reshaping the opportunities and constraints facing resource-based economies.
2. What Continues? Historical Political Economy of Resource-based Development
2.1 International Division of Labour and Dependency
Inequality in the international division of labour is among the most persistent problems of resource-based development.
Prebisch (1949/1950) identified inequalities in production structures and the distribution of technological progress through centre–periphery relations. Dependency theory subsequently emphasised how peripheral development is shaped by countries’ positions within global capitalism and by domestic and international power relations. Wallerstein’s (1974) world-systems situated these inequalities within the longer history of the capitalist world economy.
Their explanatory emphases differ, yet they raise a common question. Some countries have long exported raw materials, whilst others control technology, capital and markets. The former remain poor; the latter grow richer. Why is this structure so difficult to change?
From colonial mining to the expansion of multinational mining corporations in the twentieth century, and today's highly internationalised critical mineral supply chains, this division of labour has continuously evolved. Resource-producing countries may own the mines without controlling technology, manufacturing, finance or markets. Expanding mineral trade may therefore coexist with continued dependence on foreign capital and technology. What an obvious reproduction of structure!
Yet dependency is not immutable. East Asian industrialisation demonstrates that state policies, organisational learning and institutional change can alter a country's position within international production. The question is which countries manage to change these relationships, and why.
2.2 Industrial Linkages and Productive Capabilities
Even substantial mineral export revenues do not necessarily bring industrialisation.
Classical development economics addressed this long ago. I trust development economists will find these arguments familiar. These scholars are old companions from my theoretical education. Rosenstein-Rodan’s (1943) Big Push underlined investment coordination. Then came the rather less coordinated Hirschman (1958), whose theory of unbalanced growth and Industrial Linkages explained how particular industries stimulate other productive activities. Lewis (1954), meanwhile, highlighted labour transfers and modern-sector expansion through his dual-economy model, whilst Kuznets examined structural changes accompanying economic growth.
For mining, the question is straightforward. Can nickel smelting foster materials science, advanced manufacturing and technological innovation?
In some economies, such transformation has succeeded. The developmental state literature deepened our understanding of why. Johnson, Amsden, Wade, and Evans demonstrated the importance of states in industrial coordination, disciplining technological learning of firms and industrial transformation. Governments can stimulate learning through policy rents, provided they possess the organisational capabilities and enforcement mechanisms to do so. Capability accumulation hinges on concrete power structures and whether states can discipline firms receiving policy support.
These very questions remain alive in today’s critical mineral supply chains. Good heavens!
2.3 Resource Nationalism and Distribution of Development Benefits
Who ultimately owns the wealth generated by mineral resources?
For centuries, disputes over mine ownership, extraction licences, corporate profits, government revenues, labour remuneration and local environments have never ceased. There are so many keywords that I sometimes lose count. The interests of states, multinational corporations and local communities frequently collide.
Twentieth-century disputes over copper nationalisation, foreign capital and mining revenues in Chile and Zambia illustrate the political economy underlying Resource Nationalism. Even when states acquire ownership of mineral resources, technological, financial, market and managerial constraints persist.
Sometimes, you simply have to depend on those already-industrialised countries. We could discuss path dependence here, and ask who defined this particular capitalist mode of development. They did. But let us leave that aside for now.
Consider the domestic side, too. Political coalitions and distributions of power influence how resource revenues are used. This brings to mind the British Empire's old divide-and-rule practices in parts of South Asia and Africa: setting minority groups against majorities, cultivating internal conflicts and making colonial territories easier to govern. And when domestic conflicts intensify, international heavyweights may find opportunities to exert influence. How wicked of them! Ha!
Resource nationalism therefore carries powerful developmental aspirations but confronts domestic and international constraints. Resource revenues may support industrialisation, be appropriated by narrow interest groups, or flow overseas. Extraction may also leave environmental damage and social costs with local communities.
Resource-based development ultimately confronts the question of how benefits and costs are distributed.
3. What Changes? New Technologies and a Changing International Order
The persistence of historical problems does not mean that contemporary mechanisms remain identical. Critical minerals acquire different strategic meanings under changing technological, institutional and international economic conditions.
The energy transition has altered the scale and composition of mineral demand. Electric vehicles and renewable energy infrastructure require particular minerals. Yet battery chemistries, material substitution and recycling technologies continue evolving. A mineral may possess strategic importance today, only for its speculative value to evaporate tomorrow.
Technological concentration in mineral processing and refining has also changed the organisation of international production. Countries possessing mineral reserves may lack the necessary equipment, technologies and manufacturing capabilities. Crucial stages of production increasingly lie beyond the mine itself.
Meanwhile, geoeconomic competition and green industrial policies are reshaping state–business relations. Economic heavyweights such as the US, EU and China compete for strategic supply-chain positions through subsidies, investment and industrial strategies. Resource-producing countries likewise employ export restrictions and domestic processing requirements to strengthen their productive capabilities. Yet when countries such as Indonesia do so, these economic giants become displeased, even though they themselves climbed much the same ladder.
Criticality is itself historical and relational. Which mineral matters, to whom, for which industry and under what technological trajectory depends on particular economic structures and political objectives. This is precisely what my new working paper emphasises. The supply-chain security pursued by the US and EU may involve developmental interests quite different from the structural transformation sought by resource-producing countries.
These changing conditions may reinforce existing dependencies or create opportunities to transform the international division of labour.
4. Indonesia’s Nickel: Classical Development Question, New Context
Indonesia's nickel industry illustrates these historical continuities under new conditions.
Seeking resource-based industrialisation, Indonesia progressively restricted unprocessed nickel exports and reinstated a comprehensive nickel ore export ban in 2020 to promote domestic processing. I must say, I rather admire Jokowi’s policy initiative. It attracted substantial investment in smelting and processing, strengthening Indonesia’s position in global nickel supply chains. Admittedly, whilst export restrictions promoted domestic processing and value addition, gains remained concentrated in adjacent processing activities, with foreign investors retaining considerable influence.
Indonesia used its mineral resources and state policies to alter multinational firms' investment decisions, demonstrating the potential of resource nationalism and industrial policy. Yet does building smelters mean that domestic firms have acquired more advanced technologies? Can foreign-dominated processing industries cultivate indigenous technological enterprises? How are the resulting profits, employment opportunities and tax revenues distributed?
The EU challenged Indonesia's nickel export restrictions at the WTO, exposing tensions between domestic processing ambitions and international trade rules. Meanwhile, energy-intensive smelting and dependence on coal have raised environmental concerns.
This recalls the longstanding disputes over copper ownership, foreign capital and industrial development in Chile and Zambia. The minerals differ, the international circumstances differ, and policy instruments differ. Yet the developmental questions endure.
5. What Does This Mean for Development?
The strategic importance of resources and the development opportunities available to resource-producing countries are distinct. Growing global dependence on a mineral may strengthen a producer country’s bargaining power. Yet development opportunities depend on participation in higher-value production, technological capability accumulation and sustained access to the resulting benefits. Mineral resources possess strategic value; national developmental capabilities must still be built through industrialisation.
The aspirations and practice of resource nationalism confront complex political and economic constraints. States may pursue export restrictions and nationalisation to secure greater developmental benefits, but international trade rules, multinational capital and domestic interest groups constrain implementation. Resource nationalism sounds promising. In practice, development is fraught with conflict, compromise and institutional difficulties. How states manage these conflicts shapes whether policies generate lasting industrial capabilities.
The green transition creates new opportunities for structural transformation whilst potentially reproducing existing patterns of global dependency. Resource-rich countries can participate in emerging value chains. Yet without substantive changes in international production, technological control and benefit distribution, many may remain confined to raw-material supply and primary processing.
Here lies perhaps the most striking paradox in the political economy of critical minerals: countries possess resources the world desperately needs, yet may lack the opportunities to develop through them.
History, of course, does not predetermine this outcome. International orders, industrial technologies and state capabilities continually evolve. Resource-producing countries may exploit new strategic demand to expand their policy space, or find themselves more deeply dependent within emerging supply chains. Developmental pathways remain open.
The strategic importance of critical minerals may be changing, but the fundamental political and economic contradictions of resource-based development continue to recur and be reconfigured.