Capacity? Capability! The Classical Problem of Industrialisation and Critical Minerals

Tao Louie Xu

Rupture is the wrong story.

The energy transition invites a tale of rupture. Metals once consumed by smokestack industries now carry decarbonisation, and the countries that hold them, so the story runs, have drawn a winning card. History counsels restraint. Mineral-based development has long been judged by the following questions, and each remains open. Do mines connect to the domestic economy or sit as enclaves, a worry that Hirschman (1958) put at the centre of linkage theory? Does specialisation in primary exports lock an economy into the periphery of an unequal division of labour (Prebisch, 1950)? Do firms, workers, and an economy accumulate the technological capabilities that enable production to be improved (Lall, 1992)? And do states capture rents and then discipline their use, which depends on power relations organised between state and business (Amsden, 2001; Evans, 1995; Khan, 2010)?

Backward linkages stayed broad, yet local value added declined without value-chain governance (Fessehaie, 2012; Fessehaie & Morris, 2013). Whitworth (2015) reads the same history as persistent enclave development. The disagreement is instructive, because it concerns what deserves the name of a linkage. Procurement spending is not depth of value added, and neither is the same thing as learning. These problems belong to the organisation of mineral value chains, and critical minerals inherit that organisation.

What does the transition change?

Three conditions are new, or newly intense. The first is that demand is partly made by policy. Earlier booms followed industrial expansion. Today emissions targets, subsidies, procurement rules and above all security strategies create demand for particular materials in particular forms. Criticality, formalised by the National Research Council (2008) as importance in use combined with supply risk, is a judgement made largely from the importer’s side, and expertise from producing countries remains under-represented. The EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act sets 2030 benchmarks of 10 per cent domestic extraction, 40 per cent processing and 25 per cent recycling. Decarbonisation and supply security now depend on each other, a cleaner grid needs secure metals, and securing metals justifies state intervention in markets.

The second is material specificity. Batteries need battery-grade cobalt chemicals and cathode precursors, while permanent magnets need separated rare earths. Each route carries its own processing technology, equipment and standards. That differentiation opens room for refining, equipment production and supplier upgrading. It also raises barriers, since high-purity processing, reliable electricity and specialised capital goods are scarce in many producing economies.

The third is that geopolitics moves to the midstream. Concentration is less in ore than in processing. Importers court producers while contesting one another’s chains, which multiplies the buyers a producer can approach and so the prospect of leverage. Indonesia’s ban on raw nickel ore exports, introduced in 2020, mobilised smelting investment, though financial dependence and the distribution of returns remain contested. The WTO panel in DS592 ruled against the ban in 2022. Trade rules thus narrow policy space even as demand widens it.

Outcomes, not one.

Public debate often treats a smelter as development. It is better read as one of four outcomes that are related and distinct. Installed processing capacity records what an economy can physically transform. Domestic value added records what it retains. Transferable productive capabilities are the skills, routines and supplier networks that let firms improve processes and move into adjacent activities. Producer bargaining power is the ability to extract commitments from buyers and investors. Any one can rise while another stagnates.

In Indonesia, rising processing output and domestic value added coexist with disputed effects on productivity and distribution. In the DRC, mine output dominates, yet electricity shortages constrain refining, which concentrates in China: leverage over ore has not become leverage over the midstream. Chile’s knowledge-intensive mining suppliers did accumulate engineering and innovation capabilities, yet high-value segments cluster in Santiago and production networks stay weakly embedded in Antofagasta. South Africa’s mining equipment and specialist services suggest the more hopeful pattern of capabilities reaching related diversification. Participation in higher-value activities cannot secure domestic gains where chains are externally governed.

Green industrial policy matters at this point. It can tie mineral demand to related sectors, from grid equipment to battery materials, where supplier cohorts may form. Such diversification begins among the suppliers that already serve the mines.

Between capacity and capability as one of learning. Capacity grows when capital goods and process know-how arrive as finished packages. Capabilities grow when local engineers, suppliers and buyers take part in design, adaptation and repair.

Technology opens, institutions mobilise.

Technology sets what can be produced and learned. Ownership, finance and state coordination decide who mobilises these opportunities and who controls them. Amsden’s (2001) reciprocity principle ties public support to monitored performance, and Khan (2010) explains how the distribution of organisational power governs rent allocation and recipient discipline. Neither reciprocity nor discipline can be read off ownership or the source of finance. Foreign-financed Zambian copper met limited host-state monitoring. Shareholder-value pressure in South African platinum fed debt-financed expansion and financial fragility.

The contemporary twist, offered here as interpretation, is that strategic finance and off-take agreements now perform some of the work once done by royalty regimes and local-content rules. Their terms decide whether a producer can insist on reinvestment, supplier procurement and training.

Capabilities then feed back into bargaining. A producer that controls a processing bottleneck and can choose among buyers negotiates differently from one that exports ore. China combines the roles of rare-earth producer, dominant cobalt refiner and overseas mining investor, which is why ‘producer country’ is a poor analytical category. Indonesia is at once the author of an export ban, a host to foreign smelting capital and a borrower within global financial hierarchies. Bargaining position is a configuration, and it rewards the economy that can convert one role into another.

Who pays, and for how long?

The gains of decarbonisation are global and its costs are local. Lithium extraction in the Salar de Atacama raises conflicts over water and Indigenous territorial rights. Artisanal cobalt mining in the Congo exposes workers and communities to toxic contamination. Supply-chain compliance can repackage exploitation as a technical problem. The point is practical as well as ethical, because contested legitimacy raises the cost and slows the pace of industrial strategies that depend on mining territories.

Time adds a second risk. Substitution can soften supply disruption for buyers, which is precisely what limits a producer’s leverage, and battery chemistries evolve. Processing plants tuned to one route may be stranded. Durable capability therefore means competences that survive a change of route: metallurgy and process engineering, equipment fabrication, supplier networks and technical standards.

Strategic demand opens a window. It does not build the house. Mineral-producing economies convert criticality into durable gains where four conditions meet. A bottleneck or alternative buyers that give leverage; reliable power and infrastructure; engineering participation and supplier cohorts that carry learning beyond the plant gate; and institutions able to tie finance and rent to reinvestment, with affected communities holding real authority over terms. Geology guarantees none of these, and none is new. Criticality is conferred by others. Capability has to be built at home.

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