Costas Lapavitsas on Contemporary Dollar Imperialism

Tao Louie Xu

On 30 September 2026, Costas Lapavitsas, Professor of Economics at SOAS University of London, spoke at a webinar organised by the Union for Radical Political Economics (URPE). His central question was how US imperial power could remain so formidable when the United States had lost much of its former predominance in manufacturing, particularly with the rise of China.

1. Productive Power and World Money

The United States no longer possesses the overwhelming productive advantage it enjoyed after the Second World War. Yet the dollar remains the dominant form of world money. US Treasury securities, the Federal Reserve, and major American financial institutions occupy central positions in international finance.

Lapavitsas locates contemporary US imperial power in this asymmetry between relative productive decline and persistent monetary-financial predominance. US corporations can operate internationally in their own currency, whereas Chinese productive capital, despite its industrial and trading strength, still confronts the need for dollar liquidity. Financial power is exercised through private and public balance sheets, underwritten by US state and, ultimately, military capacity.

2. Financialisation Mark Two: The State at the Centre

The global financial crisis of 2007–09 marks an institutional break. Financialisation Mark One was dominated by commercial banks, private indebtedness, and banking income from interest-rate spreads and fees. After the crisis, public debt expanded, the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet grew, and asset managers became increasingly important.

In Lapavitsas’s words, ‘Financialisation Mark Two is, in fundamental ways, state-based financialisation.’

The Federal Reserve has become a market maker of last resort. Its liquidity provision and the expansion of public debt sustain a financial system in which asset prices and securities markets carry exceptional weight.

This transformation also changes the main mechanisms of financial profit. Commercial banks earn primarily from the spread between lending and borrowing rates. Asset managers, by contrast, are closely tied to securities valuations and capital gains. Lapavitsas invokes Hilferding’s founder’s profit to explain the underlying distinction.

Does the extraordinary concentration of equity ownership mean that Hilferding’s finance capital has returned? Lapavitsas remains sceptical. Major asset managers, including BlackRock, Vanguard, State Street, and Fidelity, own vast portfolios, but concentrated ownership does not yet amount to systematic control of productive enterprises. For now, they resemble rentiers more than the organising finance capital envisaged by Hilferding.

3. Subordinate Financialisation and ‘Liquidity Tribute’

Dollar predominance has direct consequences for developing economies. Participation in global value chains creates dollar-denominated obligations. Governments and firms must then manage access to dollar liquidity through higher domestic interest rates, foreign-exchange reserves, and monetary operations such as sterilisation.

Lapavitsas calls this subordinate financialisation. He also proposes ‘liquidity tribute’ as an alternative to treating persistent interest-rate differentials solely as a risk premium. In the webinar, he noted that the average policy rate across Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, and South Africa stood roughly four percentage points above the Federal Reserve rate in October 2025. His interpretation directs attention to the costs of occupying a subordinate position in the hierarchy of world money.

The consequences are not evenly distributed within those countries. Some domestic capital groups and sections of the middle class benefit from international financial integration. Dollar imperialism is consequently reproduced through domestic class relations, not simply imposed from outside upon otherwise unified national economies.

4. China’s Monetary Dilemma

China is the most consequential challenge to the existing order. Its manufacturing capacity and global trade position are substantial, but the renminbi has not displaced the dollar as world money. Productive strength does not automatically confer monetary power.

This creates a dilemma. Capital controls and a managed financial system protect China from forms of subordinate financialisation experienced elsewhere. Yet these same arrangements also restrict the internationalisation of the renminbi. Greater financial liberalisation might widen the currency’s international use, but could weaken institutions that have supported China’s domestic accumulation regime.

The question is therefore not simply whether the renminbi will replace the dollar. It is what institutional changes such a transition would require, and at what political-economic cost.

5. An Unsettled International Order

Lapavitsas’s account does not suggest that American hegemony remains unchanged, or that a consolidated multipolar order has already arrived. The United States faces a productive challenger without facing an equivalent alternative to its dollar-centred monetary and financial architecture.

This tension also complicates US economic nationalism. Preserving dollar dominance and the global reach of American multinationals sits uneasily alongside attempts to restore manufacturing employment and production at home. In the closing part of the available recording, Lapavitsas also challenges a simple labour-aristocracy account: workers in advanced capitalist economies have themselves borne the costs of internationalisation, restructuring, and deindustrialisation. His concluding argument connects domestic anti-capitalist politics with opposition to international imperial hierarchies.

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