Ha-Joon Chang on History, Institutions, and Politics in Economics
| Tao Louie Xu
On 19 November 2026, Ha-Joon Chang, Professor of Economics and my doctoral co-supervisor at SOAS University of London, discussed the position of history, institutions, and politics in economics at our seminar. His central concern was—economics came to deem these dimensions as peripheral, despite their fundamental role in economic behaviour, markets, and development.
The lecture connected the intellectual history of political economy with the shortcomings of neoclassical individualism, the development-policy debates of the 1990s, and the institutional and political foundations of markets. A recurring question was whether economic theory can well explain historical development when the social processes that constitute economic agents have been abstracted away at the outset.
1. From Political Economy to Economics
Chang began by reminding us that ‘economics was first developed as policy studies’. Its early purpose included advising rulers on taxation, public finance, and the organisation of economic activity. The original term political economy also reflected an understanding of the economy as a domain of social power and competing interests.
Classical economists such as Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and Thomas Robert Malthus examined the relations among capitalists, landlords, and workers. Economic development was understood through struggles over the distribution and use of the economic surplus. Capitalists were considered relatively progressive because competition encouraged productive investment, whereas landlords dissipated their surplus through consumption.
Chang described this tradition as concerned with ‘fighting over the distribution of surplus’. Questions of production, class relations, and the allocation of resources were integral to economic theory.
The rise of marginalism and neoclassical approach shifted attention towards individual choice and the pursuit of value-neutral scientific enquiry. History, institutions, and political aspects gradually became no longer central to the discipline.
Chang illustrated the importance of studying institutions through the American New Deal. Those reforms included banking regulation, securities-market oversight, social security, and labour rights. Changes began before Keynes published The General Theory in 1936. Understanding the New Deal requires attention to institutional reconstruction alongside fiscal and macroeconomic policy.
2. Neoclassical Economics and ‘Anything But Policy’
Chang characterised neoclassical economics as a deductive approach that begins with rational, self-interested individuals whose fundamental motivations are assumed to remain broadly similar across time and space.
From this perspective, ‘individuals are always the same’. The context of their decisions may change, but the underlying principles of rational choice are as universal. Historical episodes can become illustrations of an established theoretical framework.
Chang connected this methodological orientation to the Structural Adjustment Programmes promoted by the World Bank and IMF from the 1980s. Liberalisation, privatisation, and macroeconomic discipline were advanced across developing economies with substantially different historical stages and institutional projects.
When the neoliberal reforms failed to deliver their anticipated results, explanations increasingly turned towards geography, climate, culture, and institutions.
Chang called this the ‘Anything But Policy’ (ABP) discourse. The explanatory burden shifted towards the characteristics of those receiving policy prescriptions. The prescriptions themselves escaped comparable scrutiny.
He referred to research on colonial institutional origins, legal traditions, and geographical disadvantages to illustrate this intellectual tendency. His analogy was with the epicycles of Ptolemaic astronomy. Additional explanations are introduced to reconcile observations with an underlying theoretical framework.
‘What are the policy implications?’
Historical and structural constraints matter. A development explanation also must illuminate how economic agents and governments can respond to those constraints, transform productive structures, and pursue alternative development strategies.
This is an important distinction for the study of industrial policy. Explaining why states face different development conditions should also help understand the scope for purposeful institutional and economic transformation.
3. The ‘Powdered Egg’ Problem: How Institutions Form Individuals
One of the most memorable arguments came through an analogy, powdered eggs.
Chang described—eggs were processed into powder to facilitate storage and transportation during the Second World War. Water can later be added to powdered eggs to prepare certain dishes. The original structure of an intact egg cannot be reconstructed.
This example is used to explain a methodological problem in the incorporation of history, institutions, and culture into neoclassical economics.
If a theory begins with an abstract individual stripped of society and history, subsequently introducing institutional constraints may leave something essential unexplained. ‘The whole structure has been destroyed.’
The issue concerns the constitutive role of institutions. Institutions regulate individual behaviour through incentives and restrictions, also shaping preferences, social identities, moral judgements, and understandings of legitimate conduct.
Chang contrasted institutional approaches that see rules primarily as the outcomes of individual choices with those that examine the ways institutions form the individuals making those choices. Our judgements about what is reasonable or legitimate emerge through historically formed institutions and social experience.
This distinction has considerable implications for institutional economics. Understanding institutional change involves examining the historical formation of preferences and collective expectations, alongside changes in formal rules.
4. History, Development, and the Diversity of Capitalism
Chang then explained why economic history deserves a central position in economic research.
Historical understanding can challenge prevailing explanations of development. In Kicking Away the Ladder, he uncovered countries that later advocated free trade had themselves employed protectionism, subsidies, and other forms of state intervention during industrialisation. Renewed industrial-policy activism in the United States and Europe, particularly amid competition with China, has brought the historical issues back into contemporary policy debates.
History additionally reveals the limits of abstract economic models:
‘Life is stranger than fiction.’
Singapore was his first example. Its openness to international trade and FDI coexists with public landownership, public housing, and compulsory savings through the Central Provident Fund.
Sweden offered another configuration. A relatively egalitarian income distribution coexists with concentrated corporate control, notably through the Wallenberg family and foundations.
Capitalism accommodates different combinations of ownership, redistribution, corporate governance, and state involvement. Economic institutions have developed through particular historical processes and political compromises. For Chang, studying history also holds an ethical responsibility. He referred to central planning, structural adjustment, and radical economic transitions as reminders that policy experiments have consequences for real lives.
Economists, he argued, and of course I acknowledge, have a ‘moral duty to study history and try to share lessons from it’.
5. No Institution-Free Market
‘There is no scientifically given boundary for the free market.’
What can be bought and sold changes across societies and historical stages. Slavery, child labour, property rights, and other objects of exchange have been governed by very different rules.
Markets also hinge on institutions determining who may participate and under what conditions. Professional qualifications regulate access to occupations. Property rights define both entitlements and obligations. Bankruptcy laws establish how losses and competing claims are handled when enterprises fail. Even stock exchanges, often seemed as markets approaching the textbook ideal, require elaborate institutional arrangements.
Chang compared the apparent freedom of markets to a Hong Kong action films. Their flying movements appear effortless because the audience cannot see the supporting wires.
This captures a fundamental insight. Market exchange hinges upon institutions that are often invisible precisely because they have become familiar. The deeper significance is that institutional reform changes more than the efficiency of market exchange. It can redefine participation, opportunities, and the distribution of economic power.
6. Economics, Politics, and Democracy
Chang concluded by returning to the political and ethical foundations of economic studies.
He discussed Pareto improvement, under which a change is an improvement if at least one becomes better off and nobody becomes worse off. I believe everyone like me, having been trained in economics, and you know the universities in China learnt economics education from the US, should be a very expert and know this very well.
Through a vivid hypothetical example, he asked whether sacrificing one finger to solve climate change would be justified. What if the sacrifice involved a life, or many lives?
The example illustrated the moral difficulties of aggregating individual welfare. An uncompromising Pareto criterion can make redistributive changes difficult to justify as improvements when they reduce the welfare of even the wealthiest individual. And, hey, this is political.
The choice of an economic welfare criterion embodies an ethical position. Chang extended this argument to the depoliticisation of economic governance. Fiscal rules, independent central banks, and regulatory agencies are justified through technical expertise and the pursuit of economic stability. Their decisions nevertheless affect different social groups in different ways. Monetary policy, for instance, can have divergent implications for financial wealth, productive investment, and employment.
‘Why do you bother to have a democracy?’
His concern was that transferring substantive economic decisions away from elected institutions can weaken democratic accountability, particularly when the underlying policy objectives are presented as purely technical. Expertise remains indispensable. Yet expertise cannot determine society’s economic objectives independently of political and ethical choices.
What I found especially valuable was the continuity across Chang’s arguments about historical development, institutional formation, and the political history of economic policy. Institutions influence development through several interconnected processes. They constitute economic agents, organise markets, distribute power, and determine the possibilities for collective action. Economic development can in turn transform those institutions.
For my own interests in the political economy of development and industrial policy, this means particularly the way historically-formed institutions structure the design and implementation of industrial policy. And, as what I studied and investigated, industrial policy may subsequently transform productive capabilities, social relations, and institutions, this is what I call: learning by doing industrial policy.
Tao Louie Xu, 许韬, 19 Nov 2026