Antonio Andreoni on Industrial Policy at the Crossroads: Green Transition, Techno-nationalism, and Policy Hybrids
Tao Louie Xu
On 14 October 2026, Antonio Andreoni, Professor of Development Economics at SOAS, Co-Director of the Centre for Sustainable Structural Transformation, and of course my supervisor, talked about his ongoing research at the Economic Policy Seminar at Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore in Milan. The central question was: as industrial policy again becomes an indispensable instrument of global economic governance, why have China, the US, and the EU pursued such different trajectories?
1. Industrial Policy Never Truly Disappeared
Industrial Policy Never Left.
Antonio began by highlighting that the purported ‘return’ of industrial policy obscures its historical continuity. Even during the time from the 1980s to the 2010s, when neoliberalism was intellectually and politically dominant, states continued to intervene in and contribute to industrial development through fiscal, financial, technological, and very diverse policy instruments. Across the global South, industrial policy has long been intertwined with colonialism, capitalist development, state formation, and struggles for independence.
Two historical junctures were particularly important in the current transformation of industrial policy:
- The 2008 Global Financial Crisis: The US-dominated international economic order came under strain—concerns over deindustrialisation, structural economic imbalances, and industrial competition.
- Around 2015: The Paris Agreement and Made in China 2025 gave greater prominence to the policy agendas of green transition and technological competition, respectively. As US–China rivalry intensified, industrial policy became increasingly entangled with national security, supply-chain resilience, and geopolitics.
For this, two policy logics have become increasingly prominent in industrial policymaking worldwide.
And, for me, might the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis also partially explain the subsequent divergence between variations of the East Asian developmental-state model, including their accommodation with neoliberalism, and Anglo-American neoliberal orthodoxy? The developmental-state tradition per se substantially predates 1997, but the crisis may have restructured its institutional and ideological trajectories. Furthermore, disruptions to global supply chains during and after the COVID-19 pandemic constituted another major shock, contributing to the reorientation of industrial policy.
2. Two Industrial Policy Logics: GIP and TNIP
Green Industrial Policy (GIP)
GIP seeks to advance the transition towards a low-carbon, resource-efficient economy, while creating opportunities for industrial development and mitigating the costs of structural transformation.
The theoretical foundations include environmental externalities, technological learning, industrial development, and systemic coordination failures. Governments must handle market failures and actively direct technological change (directionality).
Techno-nationalist Industrial Policy (TNIP)
TNIP calls for greater state capacity to control strategic technologies, critical industries, and supply chains. It is concerned with national security, geoeconomic competition, and technological dependence on foreign supply chains.
This approach challenges established assumptions about free trade and global value chains. Can strategic technologies, critical minerals, and intermediate goods always be procured reliably through international markets?
The two logics may reinforce one another, but they may also conflict. The global diffusion of clean technologies, for instance, can facilitate emissions reductions, whereas technological and trade restrictions between states may increase the costs of the green transition.
3. China, the US, and the EU: Three Industrial Policy Hybrids
Antonio refers to the combination of two policy logics as Industrial Policy Hybrids. He explains cross-national differences through domestic political-economic structures and relationships of international competition.
China: Relatively Co-ordinated Green and Technological Autonomy Strategies
Energy security, long-term industrial planning, infrastructure investment, and technological capability-building have generated a relatively high degree of policy coherence between China’s green transition and its pursuit of technological autonomy.
Across industries ranging from solar photovoltaics and electric vehicles to robotics, China has accumulated productive capabilities through sustained investment, technological learning, and firm-level competition. Nevertheless, the expansion of green industries continues to coexist with an extensive fossil-fuel energy system.
United States: A Policy Mix Driven by Political Contestation and Industrial Interests
The Biden administration’s Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) sought to bring green investment, manufacturing reshoring, and national security into a common policy framework. Yet fossil-fuel interests, corporate financialisation, and shifts in partisan political control continue to complicate the alignment of green objectives with techno-nationalist priorities.
Antonio pays particular attention to whether public financial support translates into productive investment, and to the implications of corporate share buybacks for long-term industrial investment.
European Union: Normative Leadership and Fragmented Implementation
The EU was an early mover in promoting green technologies and climate governance, yet it has struggled to translate some of its technological advantages into sustained industrial competitiveness at scale.
Disparities in industrial capabilities across member states, high energy costs, multi-level governance, and reactive policymaking in response to US–China competition have collectively weakened strategic co-ordination.
The comparison suggests that the concrete configuration of industrial policy is conditioned by state capabilities, the structure of industrial interests, and political-economic institutions.
4. Policy Counts Tell Us Little about Policy Quality
The mere enumeration of policy measures is ‘counting of beans in the jar’.
A policy announcement with little financial backing and an industrial programme supported by substantial public expenditure, stringent firm selection, and performance requirements may each be recorded as a single policy intervention.
Research on industrial policy must examine:
- Policy Instruments: Which fiscal, financial, trade, and public procurement instruments are deployed?
- Conditionality: What conditions must firms satisfy before and after receiving public support?
- Policy Co-ordination: Do different policy instruments complement one another and generate synergies?
- State Capabilities: Does the state possess the capacity to formulate strategy, allocate resources, and monitor implementation?
Discussing the policy experiences of Portugal and the EU, we must see ‘countries that had instruments, but had no strategy’.
Governments may command an extensive repertoire of policy instruments while lacking the strategic vision and implementation capabilities needed to translate them into industrial development. Under such circumstances, an increase in public funding may even exacerbate existing regional disparities.
5. Q&A: Capacity, Competition, and the Global South
1. How Should We Understand China’s ‘Overcapacity’?
In response to questions about overcapacity in China’s electric vehicle, photovoltaic, and battery industries, Antonio offers an insightful observation:
Overcapacity, Always Relative.
Europe’s prolonged underinvestment can likewise be interpreted as a condition of undercapacity in particular industries.
China’s industrial policy facilitates capable competitors through the expansion of productive capacity, technological investment, and market competition. Stages of excess capacity, followed by industrial consolidation, may form part of this dynamic competitive process.
‘I understand industrial policy as a way of building context for competition.’
This perspective situates the relation between industrial policy and competition within a dynamic process of industrial development. It also resonates with Joseph Stiglitz’s work on the mechanisms of competition in East Asia.
2. Critical Minerals: Does Resource Ownership Confer Control?
How about South Africa’s platinum group metals (PGMs) and Indonesia’s nickel industry?
The South African case highlights the control exercised by major mining corporations over extraction, smelting, and trading. Indonesia, for comparison, has used mineral export restrictions to attract downstream investment, whereas price formation is still, of course in this global order, influenced by the business models of battery producers and automotive manufacturers.
How are resource ownership, control over value chains, and power over price formation distributed?
Whether resource endowments can be translated into industrial upgrading and domestic value capture hinges on a more complex configuration of inter-firm relations, market structures, and policy arrangements.
3. How Does Great-Power Competition Reshape Policy Space in the Global South?
Large-scale industrial subsidies in China, the US, and the EU may constrain the competitive opportunities available to smaller economies. Meanwhile, shifts in the global economic order may be creating openings for local content requirements, regional economic integration, and emerging forms of development finance.
An expansion of policy space must be accompanied by state capability-building and effective investment conditionalities if it is to support long-term structural transformation.
6. Rethinking Industrial Policy
A coherent political-economy argument runs throughout the seminar:
Industrial Policy → Policy Objectives → Instrument Mix (Packages) → State Capabilities → Structural Transformation
Within industrial policy studies, there are several interrelated questions we must consider. What forms of industrial development does the state seek to facilitate? How can different policy instruments be co-ordinated? How do domestic political-economic structures condition policy formulation and implementation? And can public resources ultimately be translated into enduring productive capabilities?
For me, I thought about this: through which concrete institutions and practices can the imperatives of green transition and techno-nationalism be reconciled and co-ordinated?
This may be a consequential political-economy question for understanding contemporary industrial policy.