Making Anti-Corruption Work: PCI, Horizontal Checks, and Development Policy

Notes on the SOAS Development Leadership Dialogue, ‘Re-Envisioning Anti-Corruption: Lessons from Research and Practice in the Global South’

| Pallavi Roy (SOAS-ACE), Tom Stocks (OCCRP) and Nick Mathiason (Finance Uncovered)

The discussion asked why transparency, formal accountability and top-down enforcement often fail to curb corruption. Pallavi Roy employed research with Mushtaq Khan to explain the Power–Capabilities–Interests (PCI) approach: anti-corruption becomes effective when actors/agents have the power, capabilities, and interests to act against particular violations. Reform requires attention to who can enforce rules in practice, and to whether doing so advances wider development outcomes.

PCI examines three interconnected conditions:

  • Power: relative ability to influence others and impose costs on rule-breaking.
  • Capabilities: their ability to engage in productive activity and comply with the relevant rules.
  • Interests: their incentives to adhere to rules and take action when others violate them.

The approach extends principal–agent method to the wider network of people and organisations transacting with principals and agents. Horizontal checks arise when such actors/agents have sufficient power and incentives to put effective pressure on rule-breakers. The checks make formal vertical accountability more effective, particularly where official enforcement is selective.

The practical task is to identify politically feasible, high-impact interventions within particular sectors. Depending on the existing relationships, policy may strengthen horizontal checks already operating, create new checks by making rule-following viable, or pursue mitigation and longer-term transformation where neither is yet feasible. Anti-corruption is incorporated into development policy and service provision.

Case Evidence

Bangladesh: climate adaptation infrastructure. Some embankments also serve as roads, while cyclone shelters may function as community centres. The dual-use benefits give locally influential landholders and traders a direct interest in construction quality. Their existing monitoring is associated with lower corruption and can reinforce formal oversight. The policy implication is concrete. Design projects to generate local benefits and incentives for effective monitoring.

Nigeria: electricity for small enterprises. Unreliable grid supply encourages self-generation and non-payment, while suppliers face significant collection risks. The research explored mini-grids and group contracts, including joint liability, through which neighbouring enterprises could support payment compliance and monitor one another. Reliable electricity creates a productive benefit worth sustaining; collective arrangements may make supply more viable by creating new horizontal checks.

Roy also discussed healthcare-worker absenteeism in Nigeria, where unsafe travel and inadequate arrangements can constrain attendance.

Tom Stocks (OCCRP) examined how professional enablers, including financial and legal intermediaries, help conceal and move illicit wealth through offshore trusts and property markets. OCCRP’s cross-border investigations combine shared records, local reporting and collaborative expertise.

Nick Mathiason (Finance Uncovered) discussed training journalists and civil-society investigators to trace corporate ownership, financial transactions and resource-sector deals. Examples from Southern Africa, extractive industries and international property markets illustrated how financial investigation can uncover networks that extend well beyond the country in which corruption originates.

How to create effective pressures for rule-following? How to expose the networks that protect corruption? PCI is a way to connect political economy theory to practical policy design. Changes in productive opportunities and incentives can also change who demands enforcement, who can exert pressure, and whether public policy delivers its intended benefits.

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