On Developmental Governance, What Digital-Asset Regulation Taught Us

Comparative Framework of Activities, Functions, and Risks

Tao Louie Xu

Mohammed Shabir Korotana scrutinised the regulation of digital assets across the UK, the EU, and the US. The legal labels attached to token were wisely set aside and gave way to a more substantive enquiry: what activities is it actually doing?

A stablecoin facilitates payments. A custody means safekeeping to hold assets on behalf of clients. A trading platform is the market infrastructure of crypto exchange.

Activities reveal economic functions. Those functions generate, or I say correspond to the risks, including runs, the commingling of client assets, and market manipulation. Regulatory responses centre on reserves, redemption rights, asset segregation, transparency, and the market governance of disclosure, suitability, liquidity, and conduct alike—one by one, respectively and specifically. In a word, what legal issues are focal vary across jurisdictions, yet the underlying regulatory functions may converge.

When unprecedented technologies, institutions, or organisational modalities emerge, governing authorities often allocate rules according to the sketchy labels, what they are called, or an imprecise category. This creates regulatory gaps, duplicated supervision, or both. A more pragmatic approach begins by examining what activities a label undertakes, what functions those activities reveal, the risks generated, and the following design and implementation of regulatory responses.

Transferrable to our political economy of development.

Object → Activities → Productive Functions → Developmental Constraints & Political-Economic Risks Generated → Governance Responses → Compliance Burdens → Feasible Better Governance → Functional Convergence

The object is an entrance. Go to identify the activities that the state undertakes through a particular policy instrument, the productive functions we see within the activities, the constraints they aim to mitigate, and the political-economic risks simultaneously generated. Filippo Marchetti, on the risk-based approach, indicates that governance intensity is supposed to adjust according to the probability, severity, and coverage of relevant risks. Ilias Kapsis, regarding legal simplification, reminds us that risk governance can generate fixed compliance costs, repetitive procedures, and interpretive conflicts. This will ultimately restrict entry, experimentation, and expansion. The burdens created by rules per se is also an object of scrutiny.

Talking about our beloved industrial policy studies, I see a governance paradox. When policy-rents are misused, projects fail, or corruption happens, governments typically add written approval and audit procedures to attach responsibility to a particular signatory. A failure means another rule, apparently deliberate yet fundamentally a cliché. Over time, the rules constitute an increasingly elaborate compliance system that erodes development agency. An alternative response often falls back on the neoliberal ‘good governance’ agenda that dominated the previous three decades.

See the industrial policy practices in China with which I am familiar, I use industrial investment, public procurement, and special economic zones (SEZs, nowadays also see development zones) as three illustrative cases.

Industrial investment, through industrial funds, gives patient capital through angel investment, venture capital, public-private partnership (very often seen in infrastructure studies), and staged financing. This patient capital is I suppose certainly not a cutting-edge concept. One can see extensive discussion of it in the work of Justin Yifu Lin, who was one of my long-standing academic heroes. ‘Hey, company, you’re not alone.’ Such investment can share the responsibility for managing technological uncertainty and coordinate industrial chains, yet may also socialise the costs and create severe exit difficulties. By the way, regarding the coordination failure and uncertainty, I believe Mazzucato is our must-read. Of course there are also Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, Ragnar Nurkse, Albert Hirschman, Russell Cooper, Andrew John, Kiminori Matsuyama, and Dani Rodrik whose work I respect a lot.

Feasible governance must attach follow-on investment to productive-capabilities transformation. ‘Let’s go! From the lab to the market.’ Market is the gym the ‘productive capabilities’ muscle is built. Market mechanisms of competition, private capital, and risk allocation are all supposed to be seen on the table. Use a magnifying glass to closely look at investments, transactions, and projects that remain indefinitely un-exited. From Amsden, Wade, and Evans to Khan, the underlying lesson is already clear—embedded autonomy entails discipline. Attach conditions to learning, exports, and today the very diverse modalities of innovation, this relies on what a state is calling.

The same logic applies to mission-oriented procurement within the entrepreneurial state, with due acknowledgement to Mariana Mazzucato. Through contract design, public procurement organises demand and technology, creates initial markets, and helps firms overcome demand uncertainty and minimum-scale barriers. The risks are equally serious. In practice, I have encountered numerous stories of collusion between officials and businesses, bid rigging, local protectionism, and the exclusion of smaller firms by dominant corporations.

SEZs and development zones concentrate the scarce capacity of state capabilities through infrastructure policy, land use policy, tax policy, trade policy, and related interventions. Resemble cities such as Hong Kong and London. The cities are financial hubs and gateways, through which regions such as East Asia and Western Europe are connected to the global capital system. I use the concepts, global production networks and global value chains, exposed more in my research areas. SEZs and development zones connect a region to the global economy through a particular locality.

When acknowledging Hirschman and Krugman, I also attend to Li-An Zhou, Wei Xiong, and Yuen Yuen Ang. Behind agglomeration and productive linkages is the possibility of slippage into land-property finance (see what I reviewed in ‘Why Cities Backfire? High-Speed Railway New Town Planning and Urban Structural Change’) and subsidy tournaments. Yes, policy interventions? Tie to the realisation of investment commitments, technological capabilities, employment, and other missions. Carry time limits and credible exit rules.

According to Khan’s political settlements framework, the conception, Feasible Better Governance, is more explicit. Under the given power structure, organisational capabilities, and policy-rents, the mission is to select an institutional configuration that mitigates critical constraints and manages the most consequential rents pragmatically in practice.

Therefore, 1) where states employ formally different policy instruments yet with similar productive functions and comparable risks generated, similarity in governance functions may exceed similarity in formal institutional design.

2) Among policy activities performing comparable functions, more procedural duplication and higher compliance costs are going to concentrate policy benefits to larger, more mature organisations possessing stronger political resources. Discussing corruption in the global South is what was usually done, and what about attention to lobbying? Identify the ‘larger, more mature, and politically advantaged organisations’ to see whether the underlying processes are functionally convergent.

3) What I mean when I say discipline? Performance conditions and exit rules are substantial only when the state is equipped with the capabilities to suspend and where justifiable withdraw policy-rents, withstanding the discontent from the beneficiary organisations of established interest. Remember ‘embedded autonomy’? Clientelism studies also remind us that governments in some global South economies struggle to withstand such discontent, across both more and less democratic systems.

Examine what a policy package or one measure actually does.

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